In this paper, we demonstrate the e¢ ciency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions in which we allow for both buyer and seller heterogeneity. This generalizes existing e¢ ciency results in the competitive search literature by simultaneously allowing for nonrival (many-on-one) meetings and private information.
In this paper, we consider the e¢ ciency of seller entry into a large market in which sellers post and commit to terms of trade and buyers then allocate themselves across sellers. Buyers di¤er in their valuations for the good that is being sold in this market, and sellers are heterogeneous with respect to their reservation values. In this environment, a second-price auction is a simple mechanism that allows the buyers who interact with a particular seller to compete for that seller's good. The competing auctions literature, e.g., McAfee (1993) and Peters and Severinov (1997) , considers the characteristics of these auctions as the market gets large, and it is now well understood that competition leads each seller to post an e¢ cient mechanism, e.g., a second-price auction with reserve price equal to seller reservation value.
The implications of a large market for seller entry are less well understood in this environment. When goods are auctioned, buyers extract an information rent from sellers. One might therefore expect that the equilibrium level of seller entry into the market would be below the level that a social planner would choose. There is, however, a counterbalancing force, namely, that when a seller enters the market, that seller "steals" buyers from the sellers who were already there and so potentially reduces the surpluses associated with these sellers. Our main result is that in a large market when sellers are free to choose their preferred mechanisms, these two e¤ects -information rent versus business stealingexactly o¤set each other, leading to the socially e¢ cient level of seller entry. In addition, we show that the equilibrium and social planner allocation of buyers across seller types coincide.
The model we present is one of competitive search. Sellers compete for buyers by posting and committing to selling mechanisms, and buyers direct their search based on these posted mechanisms. Moen (1997) and Shimer (1996) demonstrate the e¢ ciency of entry in a model of competitive search that has two special features. First, meetings between buyers and sellers are one-on-one, that is, each seller interacts with at most one buyer. Second, there is complete information in the sense that once a buyer and seller meet private information is not an issue. We generalize this literature on e¢ cient entry in competitive search in two directions. First, we allow for nonrival (many-on-one) meetings; that is, the fact that one or more buyers choose to visit a seller does not make it more di¢ cult for any other buyer to visit that seller. 1 Second, we allow for private information, which we model by assuming that sellers do not know how much the buyers at their auctions value the good. 2 With a one-on-one meeting technology and complete information, the only relevant mechanism for selling a good is price posting. With manyon-one meetings and asymmetric information, second-price auctions rather than wage posting constitute an optimal mechanism. Thus, we have a model of competing auctions.
Model
We consider a market with a double continuum of buyers and sellers. The measure of buyers is B; and we normalize the measure of sellers that could potentially enter the market to one. In this market, each buyer wants to purchase one unit; each seller has one unit of the good for sale. Every seller posts and commits to a selling mechanism, and each buyer, after observing all posted mechanisms, chooses one seller to interact with.
The meeting technology is nonrival. Finally, as is standard in the competitive search literature, we assume that buyers cannot coordinate their visiting strategies.
We assume that buyer valuations for the good are distributed as X F (x); with corresponding density, f (x); and we normalize the range of X to Jovanovic (1986) for one-on-one meetings using a particular matching function. 3 We refer to our baseline model as the ex post case. We consider the ex ante case in which buyers know their valuations before choosing which seller to visit in Section 3.
allocation of buyers across the di¤erent seller types by a function (s), which gives the expected number of buyers per seller of type s:
We model the interaction of buyers and sellers as a one-shot game with the following stages:
1. Each type s seller decides whether or not to pay a cost A to enter the market. A type s seller who does not enter retains the reservation value s:
2. Each seller who enters the market posts and commits to a mechanism to sell one unit of the good.
3. Each buyer, after observing all posted mechanisms, chooses a seller.
4. Given the allocation of buyers to sellers, goods are allocated and payments are made according to the posted mechanisms.
The payo¤ for a type s seller consists of any payments received according to the posted mechanism plus s if the good is retained. The payo¤ for a buyer with valuation x equals x if the good is purchased and zero otherwise less any payments speci…ed by the posted mechanism.
De…nition 1 An equilibrium for this game is a choice of a selling mechanism by each seller; an allocation of buyers across sellers, (s); and a cuto¤ seller type, s ; such that (i) each seller's mechanism maximizes the seller's expected payo¤ given the mechanisms posted by the other sellers in the market and the rule that buyers follow to allocate themselves across sellers, (ii) each buyer chooses a probability distribution over seller types that maximizes the buyer's expected payo¤ given the mechanisms posted in the market and the allocation rule followed by the other buyers, and (iii) the payo¤ that seller s expects on entering the market equals A + s :
In the independent private values environment that we consider, a second-price auction with reserve price equal to seller reservation value is an e¢ cient mechanism. It guarantees that the good is sold whenever at least one buyer has a valuation above the seller's reservation value and it also guarantees that, if the good is sold, it goes to the buyer with the highest valuation. Competition ensures that sellers post e¢ cient mechanisms. The intuition can be seen in Levin and Smith (1994) . They consider a single seller o¤ering a second-price auction with reserve price r who faces a …xed number of potential buyers, each with a common outside option. Their result, that endogenizing buyer entry drives r to the seller's reservation value, even though there is only one seller in the market, is generated by the …xed outside option. Each buyer who participates in the auction must get an expected payo¤ equal to this outside option. It is therefore in the seller's interest to post an e¢ cient mechanism. Posting an ine¢ cient mechanism cannot reduce the expected payo¤ per buyer that the seller has to pay and therefore can only reduce the seller's expected payo¤. The same result holds in the competing auctions environment (Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman 2012) with the di¤erence that the outside option -now equal to "market utility,"i.e., the payo¤ that a buyer can expect to get elsewhere in the market -is endogenous. 4 Levin and Smith (1994) also show that it is not in the seller's interest to post an entry fee, and the same result can be derived in the competing auctions framework using the approach of Albrecht et al. (2012) . The fact that buyer entry fees are zero and reserve prices equal reservation values in a large market means that not only is e¢ ciency ensured in the competing auctions equilibrium but also that the seller's expected payo¤ is limited to the expectation of the second highest valuation among buyers participating in the auction. This result is related to one derived in Gorbenko and Malenko (2011).
They consider competition in "securities auctions" in which sellers auction o¤ the right to develop projects for a combination of cash and a share of the pro…ts. Getting buyers to pledge a pro…t share is a way for sellers to recapture some of the information rent associated with buyer private information. Proposition 4 in Gorbenko and Malenko (2011) shows that as the number of buyers and sellers in the market gets large, all-cash auctions are posted in the competitive search equilibrium. That is, as the market gets large, competition prevents sellers from "clawing back"any part of the information rent. 5 
E¢ cient Seller Entry
To discuss the e¢ ciency of seller entry, some notation is useful. Consider a type s seller who posts a second-price auction with reserve price r; which generates an expected buyer arrival rate of (r): Let (r; (r); s) denote this seller's expected payo¤. Similarly, let 
The surplus associated with this auction equals the seller's expected payo¤ plus the expected number of buyers participating in the auction, (s); times the expected payo¤ per buyer. Because the mechanism is e¢ cient, no surplus is "left on the table."
Our proof that seller entry into this market is e¢ cient relies on the fact that
That is, if the expected number of buyers per type s seller increases, the increase in this seller's expected payo¤ is just o¤set by the expected decrease in payo¤s across the seller's 5 It is worth noting that the same logic -competition leads sellers to post e¢ cient mechanisms -applies with a rival meeting technology. However, the e¢ cient mechanism in this case does include an entry fee. See Albrecht and Jovanovic (1986) and Faig and Jerez (2005) . 6 The seller's expected payo¤ depends on the reserve price posted, the expected arrival rate of buyers and on the seller's type, s; since s is retained if the good is not sold. The buyer's expected payo¤ only depends on the posted reserve price and the expected arrival rate of other buyers. 7 In Appendix A.1, we derive expressions for (s; (s); s); V (s; (s)) and (s; (s); s).
"incumbent" buyers. 8 The intuition for equation (2) can most easily be understood in a single-seller setting.
Consider a type s seller posting a second-price auction with reserve price s. Suppose n buyers initially participate in the auction. Now suppose an (n + 1) st buyer is added. Total surplus only increases if the new buyer wins the auction. In this case, the buyer gets his or her valuation minus the maximum of s and the highest valuation across the original n buyers; that is, the marginal contribution to the surplus associated with the auction equals the new buyer's payo¤. This means, as equation (2) indicates, that the entry of a new buyer does not change the sum of the payo¤s to the seller and to the original n buyers.
We can apply this intuition to the large market setting. Suppose a new type s seller enters the market, posting a second-price auction with reserve price s: This seller can expect to attract (s) buyers away from sellers who were already in the market. Since the market is large, the probability that two or more of these buyers come from any one Thus, the information-rent and business-stealing e¤ects are exactly o¤setting.
We now consider the social planner problem. The social planner chooses a level of seller entry and an allocation of buyers across seller types to maximize total surplus in the market net of entry and opportunity cost. That is, the social planner chooses a cuto¤ seller type, s ; -all sellers of type s s enter the market; all types s > s stay outand a buyer-seller ratio for each seller type, (s); to maximize
This maximization is carried out subject to
that is, the allocation of buyers across seller types has to satisfy an adding-up constraint.
Proposition 1
The social planner values of (s) and s equal the free-entry equilibrium values.
Proof. The Lagrangean for the social planner problem is
with …rst-order conditions
Using equations (1) and (2), equation (4) can be rewritten as
That is, the social planner wants buyers to allocate themselves across sellers so that the values of visiting the various seller types in the market are equalized. This same condition holds in equilibrium since buyers must be indi¤erent across seller types.
Next, consider equation (3). This can be rewritten as
From equation (6), we have V (s ; (s )) = , so equation (3) requires (s ; (s ); s ) = A + s : That is, the marginal entrant should be just indi¤erent with respect to entering the market. Again, the same condition holds in equilibrium with free entry. 9 3 The Ex Ante Case
In this section, we consider the case in which buyers know their valuations ex ante, i.e., before choosing which seller to visit. We begin by describing the equilibrium in competing auctions for this case taking the distribution of sellers in the market as given. Then we discuss the e¢ ciency of seller entry and of the allocation of buyers across seller types.
The details are given in Appendix A.2.
Competition in selling mechanisms in the ex ante case was …rst considered by McAfee Thus, whichever auction type the marginal entrant draws buyers away from, the businessstealing e¤ect is the same. Exactly as in the ex post case, the expected contribution that a buyer makes to the new entrant's auction equals the expected loss in surplus that his or her "departure" generates in the auction in which he or she would otherwise have participated. Once again, the information-rent and business-stealing e¤ects are exactly o¤setting, giving the correct incentives for entry.
Conclusion
The constrained e¢ ciency of competitive search equilibrium is well understood when meetings between buyers and sellers take place on a one-on-one basis with complete information. However, in many situations, e.g., in standard auction settings, it is more appropriate to assume a nonrival meeting technology, i.e., many-on-one meetings. These are situations in which buyers di¤er in terms of how much they value the good that is being o¤ered for sale and in which these valuations are private information.
Our main contribution in this paper is to show that the allocation of buyers across (r; (r); 0) subject to V (r; (r)) = V using expressions for (r; (r); 0) and V (r; (r)) that were derived in Peters and Severinov (1997) . This is the problem of a seller of type s = 0 choosing a reserve price for a secondprice auction who takes into account that the reserve price determines the expected arrival rate of buyers to the auction. In the process of showing that r = 0; that is, that the optimal reserve price equals the seller reservation value, we derived
as one of the …rst-order conditions for the seller's constrained maximization problem. The same approach can be used to con…rm equation (2),
for arbitrary s:
Here we present an alternative approach to verifying equation (2) . We use the result that competition leads sellers to post e¢ cient auctions; that is, sellers post reserve prices equal to reservation values. This gives equation (1) 
To do this, we develop expressions for (s; (s); s) and V (s; (s)): We also derive (s; (s); s) and verify that our expressions for seller and buyer expected payo¤s are equivalent to the ones given in Peters and Severinov (1997) .
We begin with an expression for (s; (s); s); the expected surplus associated with the auction posted by seller s; which equals the expected maximum of s and the highest valuation greater than s drawn by one of the buyers. Suppose n buyers visit this seller and draw valuations of s or more. If n = 0; then (s; (s); s) = s: If n 1; then, conditional on n; the expected surplus is
that is, the expected maximum of the n draws that are greater than or equal to s:
The number of buyers visiting seller s who draw valuations of s or more is Poisson with parameter (s)(1 F (s)); so the unconditional expression for expected surplus is
(s; (s); s) = 1
Next, consider V (s; (s)); the expected payo¤ for a buyer who chooses a seller of type s: Suppose this buyer draws a valuation x s: This is the winning draw with probability e (s)(1 F (x)) : Conditional on winning, the buyer's payo¤ is the di¤erence between x and the highest valuation drawn by any other buyers who visited this seller or s if no other buyer drew a valuation y s: Now suppose there were n other buyers who drew y 2 [s; x): Conditional on n; the winning buyer's expected payo¤ is then
Summing against the probability mass function for n; the buyer's expected payo¤, conditional on winning with valuation x s; is
Multiplying by the probability of winning with valuation x at seller s gives
This is the expected payo¤ for a buyer who visits seller s conditional on drawing valuation x; where x s: Finally, the unconditional expected payo¤ for a buyer who visits seller s is
where the last equality follows by integration by parts (u = R x s e (s)(1 F (y)) dy; v = (1 F (x))). With s = 0; equation (10) is the expression for expected buyer payo¤ derived in Peters and Severinov (1997) . Di¤erentiating equation (8) and using equation (10) gives equation (7). This completes the derivation of equation (2).
For completeness, we also derive (s; (s); s): Consider a seller of type s who posts reserve price equal to s, and suppose this seller attracts n buyers who draw valuations of s or more. The seller gets a payo¤ of s if n = 0 or 1; if n 2; the seller's expected payo¤ equals the expected value of the second highest valuation across the buyers, i.e.,
Thus, conditional on n 2; the seller's expected payo¤ is
Summing against the probability mass function for n;
Using equations (8), (10) and (11), it is straightforward to check equation (1) . Finally, using
the seller's expected payo¤ can be rewritten as (s; (s); s) = (s)
With s = 0; this is the expression for expected seller payo¤ that is given in Peters and Severinov (1997).
A.2 Ex Ante Case
In this appendix, we give the details and prove the e¢ ciency of free-entry equilibriuim for the ex ante case, i.e., the case in which buyers draw their valuations before deciding which seller to visit. As discussed in the text, competition leads sellers to post e¢ cient mechanisms in the ex ante case just as it does in the ex post case; in particular, a seller with reservation value s posts a second-price auction with reserve price s: However, with a distribution of seller types in the market, the fact that buyers learn their valuations ex ante complicates the analysis. The extra complication arises because the distribution of buyers will vary across seller types. The surplus associated with an auction posted by a type s seller should therefore be written as (s; (s); F (x; s); s); that is, the surplus depends on the posted reserve price, s; on the expected number of buyers attracted by that reserve price, (s); and on the distribution of valuations across the buyers visiting sellers of type s, F (x; s); as well as on the seller's type, s: Similarly, the expected payo¤ for seller s is (s; (s); F (x; s); s), and the expected payo¤ for a buyer with valuation x who visits a seller posting reserve price s is V (s; (s); F (x; s); x): Applying the approach used in Appendix 1 gives
For ease of notation, however, we use (s); (s) and V (s; x); respectively. We also simplify the notation by normalizing the measure of buyers, B; to one. We use the following approach to characterize the equilibrium and the social planner solution in the ex ante case. First, we consider the case of two seller types with a mass m 1 of sellers of type s 1 and a mass m 2 of potential sellers of type s 2 ; where 0 s 1 < s 2 < 1: Second, we extend the analysis to the case of N seller types with masses m 1 ; :::; m N of seller types 0 s 1 < ::: < s N < 1: Finally, we move to a continuum of sellers by considering the appropriate limit.
A.2.1 Two Seller Types
We have argued in the text of the paper that equilibrium is characterized by a cuto¤, x ; and a measure, m 2 ; of type s 2 sellers such that
Note that x is the lowest value of x satisfying equation (15); in particular,
The corresponding social planner problem is to choose a cuto¤, b x; and a measure, b m 2 ; to maximize
Consider the partial derivative of the social planner maximand with respect to b x; in particular, consider an increase in the cuto¤ from b
x to b x + dx: The key to understanding this derivative is to recognize that the only agents who change their behavior are buyers with valuations in the interval [b x; b x + dx): Buyers with valuations x 2 [0; b x) randomized over sellers of type s 1 before the change; they continue to do so after the change. Similarly, buyers with valuations x 2 [b x + dx; 1] randomized over all sellers before the change; they continue to do so afterwards.
Buyers with valuations x 2 [b x; b x+dx) randomized over all sellers before the increase in the cuto¤; after the increase, these buyers randomize over sellers of type s 1 . Thus, there are some buyers with valuations in [b x; b x + dx) who would have participated in an auction run by a seller of type s 2 before the change but instead participate in an auction run by a seller of type s 1 after the change. To be more precise, approximately
buyers are expected to switch seller types. When a buyer switches from an auction with reserve price s 2 to one with reserve price s 1 ; there is an increase in surplus associated with the auction posted by the type s 1 seller but a decrease in surplus associated with the auction posted by the type s 2 seller: The social planner wants these two e¤ects to o¤set each other. Were this not the case, e.g., if moving buyers with valuations close to b x from type s 2 sellers to type s 1 sellers increased the surplus associated with auctions posted by type s 1 sellers more than it decreased the surplus associated with auctions posted by type s 2 sellers, then the social planner should increase the cuto¤ value.
Consider the reallocation of a buyer with valuation x 2 [b x; b x + dx) from a type s 2 seller to a type s 1 :seller. The increase in surplus at the auction posted by the type s 1 seller is the sum of three components: (i) the increase in the seller's expected payo¤, (ii) the decrease in the expected payo¤s of any "incumbent" buyers, and (iii) the expected payo¤, V (s 1 ; x) ; of the buyer who switched seller types. As we have argued in the text, the …rst two terms are exactly o¤setting; thus, the increase in surplus associated with an auction posted by a type s 1 seller that gained a buyer of type x equals V (s 1 ; x): By the same argument, the decrease in surplus associated with an auction posted by a type s 2 seller that lost a buyer of type x equals V (s 2 ; x): Now let dx ! 0; so x b x: Satisfying the …rst-order condition of the social planner problem with respect to the cuto¤ value requires
The cuto¤ b x is the lowest value of x satisfying this equation. Equation (15) thus implies b x = x ; that is, the equilibrium and social planner cuto¤s coincide.
Next consider the partial derivative of the social planner maximand with respect to b m 2 : We can write the …rst-order condition as
Since the social planner wants sellers to post e¢ cient mechanisms, we have
is a shorthand notation for the expected payo¤ per buyer visiting a type s 2 seller: Equation (17) implies equation (16) if
We now verify equation (19) . Suppose a type s 2 seller enters the market. In expectation, this seller takes (s 2 ) buyers away from incumbent sellers; thus,
is the business-stealing e¤ect associated with the entrant. Any buyer who attempts to purchase the good from the new entrant has a valuation of x or more, and these buyers randomize their visits across both seller types. If a buyer with valuation x moves from an incumbent seller to the new entrant, the loss in surplus at the incumbent seller's auction is V (s 2 ; x); and since V (s 1 ; x) = V (s 2 ; x) for all x x , i.e., high-valuation buyers are indi¤erent between the two seller types, this loss is the same irrespective of the type of the incumbent seller. The valuation x is a draw from the truncated density,
; thus, the expected loss to the incumbent seller is V (s 2 ); as given in equation (18) . Multiplying this by the expected number of buyers who visit the new entrant gives equation (19).
A.2.2 N Seller Types
Suppose there are N seller types, 0 s 1 < < s N < 1; with respective measures m 1 ; : : : ; m N ; where we consider the entry decision of the marginal seller type, s N . In equilibrim, there will exist N 1 thresholds x (s 2 ); : : : ; x (s N ) such that buyer types in [x (s k ); x (s k+1 )] randomize among sellers s 1 ; : : : ; s k : Buyers of type x < s 1 do not participate in the market; that is, x (s 1 ) = s 1 : Equilibrium is characterized by the cuto¤s, x (s 1 ); x (s 2 ); :::x (s N ); and a measure of sellers of type s N such that
:::
::::
The corresponding social planner problem is to choose cuto¤s, b x(s 1 ); b x(s 2 ); : : : ; b x(s N ); and a measure, b m N ; of type s N sellers to maximize
The proof that b x(s k ) = x (s k ) for k = 1; :::; N is essentially the same as the one given for the case of two seller types.
First, it is obvious that x (s 1 ) = b x(s 1 ) = s 1 . Buyers with x s 1 have no incentive to participate in the market nor does the social planner want them to do so. Second, given any collection of cuto¤s for sellers of type s 3 and above and given any level of entry by type s N sellers, the choice of b
The same argument that was used to characterize b x(s 2 ) in the two-seller case then implies that the social planner sets b x(s 2 ) so that
Comparing this with equation (20) x(s k ) to seller s k versus assigning that buyer to any seller with a lower reservation value. That is,
thus, by comparison with equation (21), b x(s k ) = x (s k ): By induction, the equilibrium and social planner cuto¤ values coincide for i = 1; :::; N:
Finally, in order that b m N = m N ; it must be that
that is, the business-stealing e¤ect associated with the entry of a type s N seller has to equal the expected number of buyers drawn away by the entry of the marginal seller times the loss in surplus per buyer who leaves an incumbent's auction. The argument for why this equation holds is exactly the same as in the case with two seller types.
A.2.3 Continuum of Seller Types
In the model with N seller types, for each seller type s k ; there is a corresponding buyer type x (s k ) who is indi¤erent between visiting a seller of type s k versus any seller posting a lower reserve price. The function x (s k ) is de…ned on a discrete set of points, fs 1 ; :::; s N g. To move to a continuum of seller types, we let the distance between seller types s k+1 and s k go to zero and derive a di¤erential equation that gives a continuous function x (s) as the limit of the N -seller case. The purpose of this subsection is to derive this equation.
Since the continuum-of-seller-types solution is the limit of the discrete seller type case, our e¢ ciency results carry over to the continuum. As in the ex post case, we normalize the total measure of potential sellers to one, and we denote the distribution of reservation values across these seller by G(s): We begin with a discrete distribution over seller types. Let s 1 = 0; s 2 = s; :::; s k+1 = s k + s; and let m 1 = g(s 1 ) s; m 2 = g(s 2 ) s; etc. We denote the arrival rate of buyers to type s k sellers by (s k ) and the distribution of valuations among buyers visiting type s k sellers by F (x; s k ):
f (x)dx for k = 1; :::; N 1 (23) Multiplying both sides by (s k ) gives equation (24). The cuto¤ valuation x (s k+1 ); i.e., the lowest buyer type who is indi¤erent between visitinga type s k seller versus a type s k+1 seller, is de…ned by V (s k ; x (s k+1 )) = V (s k+1 ; x (s k+1 )): Using equation (14) gives
s k+1 e (s k+1 )(1 F (x;s k+1 )) dx:
Note that F (x; s k ) = 0 for x < x (s k ); and similarly F (x; s k+1 ) = 0 for x < x (s k+1 ): Equation (25) We use the notation s k+1 = s; s k = s s; x (s k+1 ) = x (s); and x (s k ) = x (s) x (s) and note that G(s) = P k j=1 m j : Then using equations (23) and (24), we can rewrite equation (26) f (x)dx = F (x (s)) F (x (s) x (s)) ' f (x (s)) x (s): Equation (27) therefore reduces to
Together with the initial condition, x (0) = 0; equation (28) determines the function x (s):
